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ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of Case: Plaintiff Advanced Medical Diagnostics ("AMD") is in the business of
providing physician education, marketing, advertising and consulting services to imaging businesses
providing medical services to physicians. Defendant/counterclaimant Imaging Center of Idaho,
("ICI") is a diagnostic imaging center located in Caldwell, Idaho.
Plaintiff AMD entered into a written agreement with defendant ICI to provide services to ICI
to develop and grow its imaging business with area physicians. Under the agreement, the fees owed
to AMD were based, in main, on the number of computed tomographic ("CT") exams and magnetic
resonance imaging ("MRI") exams completed per month.
It is undisputed that in December 2009, defendant ICI stopped paying plaintiff AMD pursuant

to their written agreement. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant ICI for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment. ICI counterclaimed alleging that AMD breached the contract by making "an
unreasonable site recommendation" (R., pp. 36, 60).
Proceedings and Disposition Below: Subsequent to filing the complaint, plaintiff filed an
amended complaint (R., pp. 42-27) adding a count for reformation based upon mutual mistake. In
response, defendant ICI denied the material allegations of the amended complaint and again
counterclaimed alleging that AMD made "an unreasonable site recommendation" (respecting
equipment acquisition) costing ICI in excess of $88,000. Unlike ICI's first counterclaim, this
pleading contained a second count alleging that AMD fraudulently misrepresented to ICI what ICI' s
future revenue would be. (R., pp. 54-62).
Prior to trial, defendantlcounterclaimant ICI abandoned Count I of its counterclaim alleging
unreasonable conduct by AMD, and that issue was not submitted to the jury.
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The jury returned a unanimous verdict, answering the questions contained on the Special
Verdict Form (R., pp.68-71) as follows:
Question No.

Answer

(1) Did the defendant breach the contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant? . .

Yes

(2) Did the defendant prove the affirmative defense
mutual mistake? .

Yes

(3) Did the defendant prove the affirmative defense
offraud? . .

No

(4) [Amount of plaintiffs contract damages]

[Not applicable. See
Answer No.2]

(5) Did the plaintiff prove that the defendant was
unjustly enriched? . . .

No

(6) [Amount of plaintiff s unjust enrichment damages]

[Not applicable. See
Answer No.5]

(7) Did the defendant prove by clear and convincing
evidence that it was damaged by the intentional
misrepresentation on the part of plaintiff? . .

Yes

(8) We assess the defendant's damages as follows:

$00.0 . . .

R., pp. 68-71 (bracketed material explanatory).
Following the entry of the jury verdict, the defendant filed a timely memorandum of costs
and fees (R., pp. 81-136), and plaintiff filed a timely motion to disallow costs and fees with a
supporting memorandum (R., pp. 139-143). Thereafter, the district court ruled that defendant leI
was the prevailing party and awarded costs in the amount of $6970.67 and attorney fees in the
amountof$125,942,50 pursuantto Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (R., pp. 152-159). Plaintifffiled a timely
motion for reconsideration (R., pp. 160-162) which motion was denied (R., pp. 188-194).
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In its initial order on fees the district court concluded:
Here the court determines that ICI is the prevailing party, for purposes
of an award of costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d)(1) and attorney fees
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) and Idaho Code section 12-120(3). ICI
prevailed on the primary issue in this litigation: Whether ICI is liable
for damages for breach of the parties' agreement for the provision of
physician education and marketing services. Furthermore, since the
claims arise out of the same transaction, the court concludes that it
would be improper to analyze the prevailing party issue on a claimby-claim basis, rather than the overall result obtained in the action as
a whole.
R., pp. 155, 156.
In its order denying reconsideration, the district court opined that since it rejected AMD's
assertion that there was no prevailing party there is "no basis for requiring ICI to apportion its costs
fees" (R., p. 191).
Statement of Facts: The primary purpose of the agreement between AMD and ICI was to
grow ICI's imaging business. As recited in the agreement:
Whereas, AMD and ICI desire to enter into this Agreement whereby
AMD and ICI will work together to optimize the number and quality
of diagnostic imaging studies, specifically CT and MR exams,
performed by ICI, to increase ICI's notoriety within its communities,
and to improve ICI's patient care.
R., p.15.
ICI alleged in both its initial counterclaim (Count I) that AMD was "to make all necessary
and!or recommended site preparati ons" (R., pp. 35, 59 ) but made "unreasonab Ie" recommendati ons.
In its counterclaim to AMD's amended complaint, ICI re-alleged Count I and added Count II,
alleging that AMD fraudulently misrepresented ICI's future revenue. (R., pp. 60, 61). Just prior to
trial, ICI abandoned Count I (R., pp. 137, 138), which alleged AMD's "unreasonable" conduct
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breached the agreement.
Because the appellate issues focus on the entitlement to attorney fees and the existence, or
not, of a prevailing party, these issues are resolved, in the main, by reference to the Amended
Complaint (to which the parties' agreement is attached) (R., pp. 42-47), the Amended Answer and
Counterclaim (R., p. 54-62) and the Special Verdict (68-71). A detailed examination of the facts
is rendered unnecessary because the attorney fees award is based upon Idaho Code § 12-120(3), i.e.
the undisputed existence of a commercial transaction, and not Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule
54(e)(1), i.e., a frivolous prosecution or defense.
Plaintiff AMD sought damages well into six figures for ICI's breach of contract (R., p. 44).
In its Counterclaim, defendant ICI claimed that AMD breached the contract by making an
"unreasonable" recommendation that ICI purchase a piece of diagnostic equipment for $88,658.40
for which "insurance companies in Idaho do not cover the costs associated with this equipment"
(Count I, R., pp. 36, 60). Respecting ICI's fraud allegations (Count II, R., pp. 60, 61), the
Counterclaim does not quantify the damages arising from the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation
of ICI's future revenue.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Whether defendantlcounterclaimant ICI can be designated as the "prevailing party"

for the purpose of an attorney fee award in view of ICI' s abandonment of its contract claim and the
following aspects of the jury verdict: (1) the finding that ICI was in breach of contract; (2) ICI's
failure to prove that AMD committed fraud as a defense to ICI's breach of contract; and (3) that ICI
was not entitled to monetary damages.
2.

Whether the district court erred by (1) failing to act in accordance with the applicable

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5

legal standards for determination of the "prevailing party" and (2) by failing to reach its
determination by an exercise of reason.
3.

Whether, assuming ICI to be a prevailing party, ICI's claim for attorney fees should

be denied because of its failure to isolate the fees attributable to its successful claim results from the
fees attributable to unsuccessful claim results.
4.

Whether, assuming ICI to be a prevailing party, it was incumbent upon the district

court to apportion attorney fees as to each claim which defendantlcounterclaimant ICI successfully
prosecuted or defended and which claim carried with it an attorney fee entitlement.
5.

Whether attorney fees on appeal are appropriately awarded to the party or parties on

appeal related to the claims upon which each such party or parties prevail pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-120(3).

ARGUMENT
Standard of Review: (1) The determination of a prevailing party or parties is
subject to the abuse of discretion standard: According to a 2009 Supreme Court decision:
A court's determination of prevailing party status will not be
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho
903,915,204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009). When examining whether a
trial court abused its discretion, this Court considers whether the
court: (1) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of this discretion and consistently within the
applicable legal standards; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise
of reason. Id. "A determination on prevailing parties is committed to
the discretion of the trial court." Id at 914,204 P.3d at 1125. "Only
in rare cases has this Court or the Court of Appeals reversed a trial
court's determination of which party prevailed." Id.
Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 173,219 P.3d 1188 (2009).
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(2) The apportionment issue may be subject to the abuse of discretion standard: In
Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471,259 P.3d 617 (2011), the Court ruled that district court "had

a duty to apportion to each of the parties only the attorney fees related to the claims upon which each
party prevailed". Id., 151 Idaho at 478. Failure to do so, the Court ruled, was an abuse of discretion.
Id., 151 Idaho at 479.

(3)

Alternatively, it may be argued that failure to apportion in appropriate

circumstances is subject to free review: In addition to the discretionary exercise of identifying
the "prevailing party", Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) requires that an apportionment occur that is consistent with
the claims and "resultant judgment or judgments obtained". In Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471,
259 P.3d 617 (2011), the Court opined that the district court has a "duty" to undertake
apportionment where each side has only partially prevailed. Jd., 151 Idaho at 478. Outside the
judicial context, the existence of a duty is a question oflaw over which the appellate courts exercise
free review. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 260, 245 P.3d 1009 (2011). Given the "duty"
articulated in Schroeder, it may be argued that whether the district court here has complied with that
duty is subject to free review.
Summary of Argument: (1) There is no prevailing party in this case: Of the eight
questions to the jury, defendant ICI prevailed on only three: (1) the existence of mutual mistake, (2)
that AMD was not unjustly enriched, and (3) that plaintiff AMD made intentional
misrepresentations. However, the jury was required to reach the mutual mistake issue because they
found ICI was in breach of contract.

Although they found that AMD made intentional

misrepresentation, the jury specifically found that fraud was not a defense to ICI's breach of contract.
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As to those misrepresentations, it found that ICI sustained zero damages. More to the point, neither
AMD nor ICI prevailed on their claims for monetary damages.
Finally, prior to trial, defendant/counterclaimant ICI abandoned Count I of the counterclaim
which sought contract damages (Tr., pp. 137, 138).
(2) The district court abused its discretion in identifying lei as the prevailing party:
In assessing whether the district court abused its discretion in finding defendant ICI to be the
prevailing party, this Court must consider whether the district court acted consistently with the legal
standard applicable to a determination of whether there was a prevailing party. Shore v Peterson,
146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114 (2009). In applying the legal standard respecting ascertainment
of a prevailing party, the district court is to consider the following: (a) the final judgment obtained
in relation to the relief sought; (b) whether there were multiple claims between the parties; and (c)
the extent to which each of the parties prevailed on their claims. Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho
406,411, 659P.2d J60(App.1983),citedinNguyenv. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 192, 191 P.3d 1107
(App. 2008).
The district court's decisions (R., pp. 152 - 159; pp. 188 - 193), although recognizing its
discretionary latitude, failed to undertake an analysis covering points (a), (b), and (c) above.
(3) Defendant leI's failure to segregate fees should result in denial of claimed fees.
Assuming ICI is deemed the prevailing party, its memorandum of costs failed to isolate fees
attributable to the successful prosecution or defense of claims from those fees attributable to
unsuccessful matters, i.e., ICI's breach of contract; its failure to prosecute AMD' s breach of contract;
leI's unsuccessful invocation of fraud as a defense; and failure to obtain a money judgment on its
fraud claim. Under this circumstance, ICI's attorney fee claim should be denied. Brooks v. Gigray
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 8

Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 78, 901 P.2d 744 (1966).

(4)

Failure to apportion fees: Assuming that defendant ICI is treated as a prevailing

party, the district court had a "duty" to award ICI only those attorney fees related to the claims upon
which ICI prevailed. Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471, 478, 259 P.3d 617,624 (2011). The
district court justified its refusal to apportion on its decision that defendant ICI was the prevailing
party.
. . AMD contended that there was no prevailing party in this
action for the purposes of Rule 54. Having rejected that assertion, the
court finds no basis for requiring ICI to apportion its costs and fees
among different claims in this action.
R., p. 191.
Whatever AMD's assertion respecting the existence or not of a prevailing party, such
unsuccessful assertion should not impact the analysis of apportionment issues respecting any claimed
fees, i.e., the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Id., 151 Idaho at 478.

THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT leI WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY
No prevailing party: As noted above, defendant ICI was found in breach of contract but
escaped a damage award under the doctrine of mutual mistake. Plaintiff AMD, according to the jury,
made an intentional misrepresentation, but the jury did not award ICI damages. That is, each party
escaped a damage award. According to a recent Supreme Court decision, this scenario supports the
conclusion that "there is no prevailing party":
The district court determined that Trilogy [plaintiffJ had prevailed on
the issue of breach and that Johnson [defendant] had prevailed on the
issue of damages. It concluded, therefore, that there was no
prevailing party pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B). . . . Rule 54
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directs courts to consider who the prevailing party is in relation to the
relief sought by each party
Trilogy Network Systems, Inc. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007) (bracketed

material explanatory).
In addition to the absence of damages on the misrepresentation claim (Count II), it should
be repeated that ICI chose to abandon Count I of its counterclaim against AMD (breach of contract)
on the eve of trial.
By contrast, an example of the appellate process identifying a prevailing party
notwithstanding an apparent standoff is Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 204 P.3d 1114 (2009).
In that case, the defendant alleged the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction and
counterclaimed, in the alternative, for conversion. Following trial, the district court found for the
defendant on his affirmative defense and against him on the counterclaim for conversion. This Court
reversed the district court's decision that there was no prevailing party, reasoning that the
counterclaim was not dismissed on the merits. Rather, opined the Court, defendant's successful
defense (accord and satisfaction) rendered the counterclaim moot rather than lacking in merit. Id.
146 Idaho at 914,915.
In Israel v. Leachman, 139 Idaho 24, 72 P.3d 864 (2003), there were claims and
counterclaims as with the case at bench. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant
on plaintiffs' claims of rescission and contract damages. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiffs
damages for violation of the Consumer Protection Act. This Court affirmed the district court's
finding that there was no prevailing party:
The district court utilized the prevailing party analysis as set forth in
I.R.c.P. 54(e) and 54(d)(1)(B) by looking at the multiple claims of
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 10

the parties and determining who prevailed on which issues. The
district determined that each party prevailed in part and did not
prevail in part and decided that each party should bear its own costs
and fees. The district court in making this determination did not
venture outside the boundaries of its discretion, nor did the court act
inconsistently with the legal standards applicable to the award of
attorney fees. Further, the decision to require each party to bear its
own fees appears to be reached through the exercise of reason.
Id., 139 Idaho at 27.
By way of contrast as discussed more fully below, the district court here did not break down
who prevailed and who did not prevail. Rather, the district court declined to engage in any
apportionment analysis because she "rejected" AMD's assertion that there was no prevailing party
(R., p. 191).
Had the district court summarized the breakdown ofthe jury verdict, it would have appeared
as follows:

Issue Resolved

For Plaintiff AMD

ICI contract breach

x

x

Mutual mistake
Fraud as a contract defense

For Defendant ICI

x
x

Unjust enrichment
Fraud damages

x

AMD breach (abandoned by ICI)

x

In considering the "result of the action . . . in relation to the relief sought", the clear
conclusion is that neither side prevailed. Rule 54(d)(1)(B), I.R.C.P.

The district court abused its discretion in finding that defendant ICI was a prevailing
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party: The time-honored criteria for ascertaining whether a trial court abused its discretion is as
follows:
When examining whether a trial court abused its discretion, this
Court considers whether the trial court: (1) perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of this discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of
reason.
Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho at 915.

The district court alluded to these criteria as well as the language of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) that
"[t]he trial court . . . may determine that a party prevailed in part and did not prevail in part" and
apportion fees accordingly. R., p. 155). However, the district court failed to discuss on which issues
leI prevailed and on which issues it did not prevail. That is, the district court did not rule
"consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it". Id
Rule 54(d)(1 )(B), I.R.C.P. directs the trial court to consider three points respecting resolution
of the "prevailing party" issue:
In reaching the decision as to whether a party "prevailed," Rule
54(d)(l)(B) requires the court to consider three areas of inquiry: (a)
the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation to the
relief sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there were
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (c) the extent to
which each of the parties prevailed on each of the issues or claims.
Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho at 406; cited in Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho at 192.

In addition to failing to consider the criteria set forth in Rule 54(d)(1 )(B) and failing to reach
a "no prevailing party" conclusion as was done in Israel v. Leachman, the conclusion that the district
court did reach was not by "an exercise of reason".
In fact, AMD never requested an award of costs and/or fees as the
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 12

prevailing party in this case. Instead, AMD contended that there was
no prevailing party in this action for purposes of Rule 54. Having
rejected that assertion, the court finds no basis for requiring ICI to
apportion its costs and fees amount different claims at issue in this
action.
R., p. 191.
That is, rejection of AMD's assertion that there was no prevailing party does not compel the
conclusion that ICI was the prevailing party.
Finally, the district court's reliance on Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating. 141 Idaho
716, 177 P.3d 130 (2005) is misplaced. In Eighteen Mile Ranch, this Court reversed the lower court
finding that there was no prevailing party. In that case, the defendant successfully defended against
the complaint and, unlike ICI here, won a money judgment on its counterclaim.
BECAUSE DEFENDANT ICI ONL Y PREVAILED ON THE ISSUES OF
MUTUAL MISTAKE AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT, IT IS NOT ENTITLED
TO RECOVER THE ENTIRETY OF ITS CLAIMED ATTORNEY FEES
Preliminary note: This section of the Appellant's Brief assumes, without conceding, that

defendant ICI is found to be a prevailing party.
Failure to segregate: The district court awarded defendant ICI the entirety of its claimed

attorney fees (R., pp., 156, 158) notwithstanding its failure to prevail on the issues of its breach of
contract, fraud damages and its abandoned breach of contract claim versus AMD. In its Memorandum
of Costs and Fees (R., pp. 81-136), defendant ICI did not segregate the attorney fees respecting its
successful claims and defenses from its unsuccessful claims and defenses.
Where a plaintiffpleads multiple claims, some bearing attorney fee entitlement and other claims
not so entitled, Idaho law is clear that any fees awarded must be limited to the prosecution or defense
of those claims which carry a statutory entitlement to fees. Where the applicant for fees fails to make
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 13

such segregation or segregation is not possible, the claim for fees must be denied:
However, the denial offees here resulted from the fact that the fees
attributable to the contract claim could not be separated from the
conversion claim, which the district court found outside the scope of! C
§ 12-120(3). The fact that the conversion claim arose out of a
commercial transaction is not sufficient to apply I.e. § 12-120(3): "the
commercial transaction must be integral to the claim and constitute the
basis upon which the party is attempting to recover."
Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho 72, 79, 910. P.2d 744 (1996) (emphasis added)l.

As this Court has held, a fee application is limited to claims which carry a fee entitlement:
This Court has held attorney fees under § 12-120(3) are unavailable
when the claim is based on a statutory provision. Shay v. Cesler, 132
Idaho 585, 587-89, 977 P.2d 199,201-03 (1999). However, attorney
fees are unavailable under § 12-120(3) for statutory claims only when
the statue upon which the claim is brought includes its own attorney fees
provision. Id. When various statutory and common law claims are
separable, a court should bifurcate the claims and award fees pursuant
to § 12-120(3) only on the commercial transaction.
Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 136,59 P.3d 302 (2002) (emphasis added)

Rationale for denial of fees: As presented to the district court, ICI did not isolate the fees
respecting ICI's successful claims and defenses from ICI's unsuccessful claims and defenses. In
affirming the district court in Brooks, the Court quoted the district's reasoning for denial of fees where
the request made no distinction between the intentional tort (no fees) and breach of contract (fees):
And with regard to conversion it does not fall within the contract and it
does not fall within the statutory authority ofldaho Code 12-120(3), so

IFrom the standpoint of which transactions fall within the thrall of Idaho Code § 12120(3), Brooks may no longer be good law. See City of McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201
P.3d 629 (2009). However, the principle remains viable that an attorney fee claimant must
segregate out from his claimed attorney fees those service fees for claims on which he did not
prevail as well as claims that carry no fee entitlement.
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there would be no attorney fees at all entitled under the conversion. The
Court is unable 10 determine which attorney fees were used for the
conversion and which were used for the contract action. The Court
explains the jury's verdict as they did not find a contract existing at that
time between Gigray Ranches and Brooks, so Idaho Code 12-120(3)
does not apply nor does [sic] the contractual terms, itself.

Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, 128 Idaho at 77-78 (emphasis added; bracketed material in original)
Although Brooks and Willie deal with the distinction between claims that do not have statutory
fee entitlement from those claims that do, this principle would equally apply to those claims on which
the attorney fee applicant prevailed as distinguished from those claims on which he did not prevail.
That is, in both categories, the fee applicant must segregate out claims on which the applicant did not
prevail as well as those claims which carry no fee entitlement.
Here, defendant ICI made no such distinction. Thus, even if defendant ICI is deemed to be the
prevailing party, which is disputed, either the failure or inability to "bifurcate the claims", as noted in

Willie and Brooks, must cause ICI's claim for fees to fail.
The Court looked at the attorney fees to see ifl could distinguish which
ones were used on the intentional tort and which ones were used on the
defending of the contract. And I was unable by this affidavit to make
these findings, so the Court would not grant attorney fees in this
particular case on the Memorandum of Costs.

Brooks v. Gigray Farms, 128 Idaho at 77 (quoting with approval the district court decision).
GIVEN THE FAILURE OF ICI TO SEGREGATE OUT ITS UNSUCCESSFUL
CLAIMS/DEFENSES IN ITS FEE CLAIM, IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON THE DISTRICT
COURT TO REQUIRE SUCH APPORTIONMENT OR, WHERE SUCH
APPORTIONMENT WAS NOT MADE, TO DENY THE CLAIM
Where there are multiple prevailing parties, the district court has a duty to apportion fees
commensurate with each party's respective successes and failures:
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Thus, although the district court has discretion to award costs and fees
to both Schroeder and Partin as prevailing parties, the court had a duty
to apportion to each of the parties only the attorney fees related to the
claims upon which each party prevailed. Ramco v. H-K Contractors,
Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 113,794 P.2d 1381, 1386 (1990) ("the claims
should be severed and costs analyzed separately for each."). The trial
court's decision to award all attorney fees incurred by each party in
connection with the litigation, without attempting to apportion those fees
based upon the respective claims upon which each party prevailed, was
inconsistent with the governing legal standard. Thus, the district court
abused its discretion. We vacate the district court's award of attorney
fees and remand for the district court to apportion attorney fees and costs
consistent with the requirement ofI.R.C.P. 54.
Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho at 478, 479. See also Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho at 136 ("a

court should bifurcate the claims . . ") (emphasis added).
This holding is consistent with Rule 54(d)(I)(B) which states in pertinent part:
. . . The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party
to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so
finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims
involved in the action and the resultant jUdgment or judgments obtained.
Jd. (emphasis added).

As noted above, the district court awarded defendant ICI the entirety of its claimed fees,
including fees respecting claims on which it did not prevail, i.e., ICI's breach of contract, absence of
AMD fraud damages and ICI's abandonment of its claim against AMD for breach of contract.
Accordingly, under the authority of Schroeder, the district court either breached its duty or abused its
discretion in awarding defendant ICI the entirety of its claimed attorney fees without apportionment.
UNDER THOSE SAME AUTHORlTIES HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT ICI IS
NOT THE PREVAILING PARTY OR, ALTERNA TIVEL Y, THAT ICI HAS
PREVAILED ONLY IN PART, ICI IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF COSTS
Plaintiff AMD incorporates the authorities cited above for the proposition that defendant ICI
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is not the prevailing party in this matter and, hence, is not entitled to the costs awarded by the district
court (R., p. 156). Alternatively, citing the above authorities, ICI's claimed costs must be apportioned
based upon those claims on which it prevailed and those claims on which it did not prevail.
IN THE EVENT PLAINTIFF AMD IS THE PREVAILING PARTY ON THIS APPEAL, IT
IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE, § 12-120(3)
When the issue on appeal concerns the entitlement to attorney fees on a litigated commercial
transaction, Idaho Code § 12-120(3) is applicable. Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating & Paving,
141 Idaho 716, 721, 117 P .3d 130 (2005). In the event plaintiff AMD prevails on appeal, it is entitled
to an award of attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
In view of the fact that defendant ICI prevailed on less than a majority of the questions on the
jury verdict, neither it nor AMD is a prevailing party in this case. Accordingly, it was an abuse of
discretion for the district to conclude that ICI was the prevailing party. As an additional basis for
vacating the award of fees to ICI, ICI failed to submit a memorandum of costs and fees which
apportioned the claimed fees and costs, winnowing out those fees/costs expended on issues on which
ICI did not prevail. Alternatively, it was incumbent upon the district court, absent an apportionment
by ICI, to apportion fees based upon which party prevailed and which party did not prevail as to each
issue. Because ICI's memorandum of fees was not subject to apportionment given its lack of issue-byissue particularity, ICI's claim for fees and costs should be denied.
In the event AMD prevails on this appeal involving a commercial transaction, it is entitled to
attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3).

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 17

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of September, 2012.

Attorney for plaintiff/appellant
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